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Two questions, not one
Most investment committees run Ukraine's defense sector through a single filter: country risk. That's the wrong level of analysis. Every deal has two separate layers — the operating environment the company sits in, and the company itself: its product, its order book, its cap table, its path to revenue. Collapse them into one number and every Ukrainian company looks the same. Separate them, and most of what actually decides whether a deal is fundable turns out to be about the company, not the country.
That's also why the useful diligence question isn't “is Ukraine safe” — it's “is this specific company's structure, IP and ownership clean.” That question is answerable, and it's the difference between a deal your committee can actually underwrite and one that stalls in the first meeting.
| Political-risk insurance (DFC) | ~$848M written since 2022 (portfolio ~$1.6B) |
|---|---|
| DFC × MIGA | Joint political-risk-insurance framework, signed June 2026 |
| Private war-risk cover | Up to $100M in policies — Aon / Kniazha (VIG), DFC-backed, Feb 2026 |
| Team continuity | Critical-infrastructure status reserves key staff; Defence City regime in force since Jan 2026 |
| Production footprint | Deliberately distributed across small, dispersed sites, not concentrated in a way one strike can remove |
A risk that's insured and structured is a line item on a term sheet, not an unknown. And the presence of DFC / MIGA cover already does part of your diligence for you — these institutions don't underwrite assets they haven't scrutinized.
What this looks like in practice
None of this is theoretical anymore. The government's own preferential-loan program for arms manufacturers just crossed 167 loan agreements and over UAH 10 billion disbursed — up from 162 agreements and UAH 9.8 billion in June — with 12 loans already fully repaid. That's the state's own capital following through, not just announcing. Here's what's actually changed between the first checks anyone wrote into this market and now.
| 2022 | 2025 / 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| War-risk insurance | Effectively unavailable | DFC ~$848M written since 2022; DFC × MIGA framework (Jun 2026); Aon/Kniazha facility up to $100M (Feb 2026) |
| Deal structure | Ad hoc, domestic-only entities | Cross-border holding is now the standard structure a foreign investor actually holds |
| State buyer | Fragmented across agencies | One counterparty: the Defence Procurement Agency absorbed the State Logistics Operator in Jan 2026 — a single window for both lethal and non-lethal procurement |
| Exits | None on the record | TAF Industries' majority stake in Teslia + Resist.UA's full exit (May 2026); Swarmer's Nasdaq listing (SWMR); UFORCE marked near $1B |
| Who's already in | A handful of angels | 9 specialist funds with people on the ground + the €1B NATO Innovation Fund + strategics like Quantum Systems |
None of this erases the operating challenges. It does mean the risk is finite, priced — and increasingly someone else's to hold if the deal is structured right.
What we actually check before a company reaches an investor
A Ukrainian defense company is diligenced differently than a typical growth-stage tech company. The questions that matter are practical: has the product actually been used in the field, or only demonstrated? Is the revenue real, signed orders — or grants relabeled as sales? Is the ownership chain fully disclosed and clean? Does the company legally own its own IP?
Those four questions sit behind the six domains we run before a company reaches an investor's desk.
| Domain | What “pass” looks like | Red flag — dig deeper |
|---|---|---|
| Structure & cap table | A foreign holding owns the Ukrainian operating entity — that's the entity you'd actually buy into | No holding: you'd be investing directly into a domestic entity |
| Intellectual property | Formally assigned to the company, documented | Code, designs or firmware still sit with individual founders or contractors |
| Financials | Revenue is signed, repeat orders and deliveries | Revenue is Brave1 / state grants or letters of intent, presented as sales |
| Sanctions & ownership | Full beneficial-ownership chain disclosed and screened clean | Any Russia, Belarus or sanctioned-party link anywhere in the chain |
| Combat record & contracts | Fielded at scale, with a documented result | A demonstration video stands in for a deployment record |
| Export & compliance | Product classified (dual-use/military), SSECU-permitted, key staff reserved | Classification undone, or no mapped export path |
This checklist runs as an interactive self-score on our blog, with a downloadable version — link below in Good Reads.
How a clean deal actually gets built
So the target clears some of the six domains and not others. What now? None of the companies clearing committee today figured this out alone — there's now a working sequence.
| Stage | Why it matters | How to start |
|---|---|---|
| 1Separate the two risks | Country and company risk get averaged into one number by default — that's what kills good deals in committee before diligence even starts. | Score the target only against the six-domain list above; treat war risk as its own line, not a multiplier on everything else. |
| 2Put the value outside the war | The entity you'd hold shares in is a cross-border holding, outside Ukraine, under law you can enforce — it owns the Ukrainian entity and, critically, the IP. | We can walk you through how the structure is built without tripping Ukraine's export-control regime on the IP transfer itself. |
| 3Price and insure what's insurable | War-risk cover is now a real, if early, market — DFC/MIGA political-risk insurance, and a DFC-backed facility writing policies up to $100M. | We can point you to the underwriters already active in this market. |
| 4Fix the legal foundation | This is where most companies fail diligence — not on the product, on paperwork that was never done: jurisdiction, IP assignment, cap table, UBO chain. | Prepared with input from our legal partner, who works with us on defense-tech investment structuring. |
| 5Close on the export path, not the wartime contract | A company selling to one domestic buyer has a ceiling; codification and export-readiness are what expand the multiple. | We screen for this before a company reaches your desk. |
Stage four is where most deals actually stall, so here's what our legal partner actually walks investors through. At seed stage, the mechanics are usually a SAFE or a convertible note — except a SAFE doesn't work under Ukrainian law, so a note is written against the Ukrainian entity with a clause that converts it into equity in the foreign holding once one exists, not the domestic company. Which jurisdiction that holding sits in follows the target market, not a default: the UK, Estonia and the US are the three that come up most. Forming the entity itself is fast, often three days; the real bottleneck is the bank account, which can take a month or more, because a payment provider that later discovers a company is dual-use rather than the generic “tech business” it registered as will simply decline the funds. IP has to be formally assigned into the holding before equity changes hands, structured so the transfer itself doesn't trip Ukraine's export-control regime on military and dual-use technology. And before any of that: full beneficial-ownership and sanctions screening on the investor's own side, not only the company's — treated as a precondition, not paperwork.
See the pipeline behind these numbers
Every company we bring to an investor has already been through the six-domain check above — structure, IP, financials, ownership, combat record and export — before it reaches your desk.
If you want to see what's already cleared that bar, or want a second opinion on a deal you're already looking at, let's talk.
Introducing our legal partner: Juscutum
We're growing our legal bench for exactly the questions above, starting with a name worth knowing.
We're partnering with Juscutum, Ukraine's defense-tech legal practice — the team behind the country's first investment deals into autonomous systems, and legal counsel to a growing roster of international funds looking at Ukrainian defense and dual-use companies.
If you're structuring a deal into Ukraine and want a second set of eyes on jurisdiction, IP assignment or the ownership chain before you sign anything, this is exactly what the partnership is for.
Good reads
- What Returns Can You Expect in Ukrainian Defense-Tech? — the return math, not the pitch.
- The Due-Diligence Checklist for a Ukrainian Defense Company — the interactive six-domain self-score referenced above.
- The Cross-Border Holding, Explained — the structure that separates what you own from where it operates.
The investors already active in Ukraine's defense market didn't wait for a perfect risk picture — they moved once the structure, the numbers and the protections were clear. That clarity is what this newsletter is for.
Frequent questions
- DFC & MIGA sign agreement to advance political-risk insurance in Ukraine — U.S. DFC
- Aon & Kniazha (Vienna Insurance Group) launch a DFC-backed war-risk facility enabling up to $100M in cover
- Defence City in Ukraine — a comprehensive guide (launch Jan 2026, to 2036/EU accession) — Accace
- The Ukrainian defense technology market: opportunities for investors — KSE Institute
- TAF Industries takes majority of Teslia (Phantom Technology UGV); Resist.UA fully exits — The Defender
- NATO Innovation Fund — €1bn multi-sovereign venture fund
- War & Sanctions — Ukraine's official portal of sanctioned persons and entities (beneficial-ownership screening)
Published: 1 September 2027
